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Abstract
The present paper discusses the concept of undue payment as found in the Polish Code of Obligations 
of 1933. The research is comparative in nature since it also explores the institution in question in 
other contemporary codes (Code Civil, ABGB, BGB and Obligationrecht), Roman law, and the Polish 
Civil Code of 1964 (1). The discussion is concerned with the framework of legal provisions on undue 
payment in the aforementioned sources (2). Furthermore, while applying a framework of the Roman 
condictiones the paper analyses the grounds of the action (3). It presents circumstances which allowed 
a payor to seek recovery of his payment (4–6) and those which precluded the claim (7). Then the paper 
gives an illustration of the scope of a payee’s liability (8). In his fi nal remarks, the author attempts to 
assess undue payment as regulated in the Code of Obligations (9). 
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1. Introduction
Among the legal professionals the Polish Code of Obligations of 19331 has deserved-
ly enjoyed the reputation of an outstanding piece of legislation.2 It continues to attract 
a great of deal of interest: both for legal scholars preparing their lectures and courts 
working on their judgments it remains a favourite quarry of exemplary regulations.3 
Recently the Code has also become the subject of a number of impressive studies.4 It 
seems that they treat the Code as a vital source of contract law, but pay little attention to 
other sources of obligations like unjust enrichment or tort.
This study deals with one of those “forgotten” concepts, i.e. undue payment. It was 
defi ned by Roman Longchamps de Bérier, Head of the Code of Obligations Legislative 
Committee, as “giving, acting or refrain from acting in order to fulfi l an obligation which 
in fact was non-existent”.5 The pertinent provisions of the Code of Obligations will be 
1  Decree of the President of the Republic of Poland of 27 October 1933: Code of Obligations [Kodeks 
zobowiązań], Dz.U. R.P. [Offi  cial Gazette] Nr 82, poz. 598). Whenever an Article is mentioned in this text 
without further reference to the normative act it comes from, e.g. Article 129, it is an Article of the Polish 
Code of Obligations of 1933 (herafter also as KZ). 
2  U. Ernst, Polish Civil Code [in:] The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law, Oxford 
2012, vol. 2, p. 1289; L. Górnicki, Metoda opracowania i koncepcja kodeksu zobowiązań z 1934 roku [Meth-
odology and the General Idea of the Code of Obligations of 1933], “Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis” 2008, 
Prawo, 305, p. 93; G. Jędrejek, Polski kodeks zobowiązań z 1933 roku. Powstanie, źródła, znaczenie dla eu-
ropejskiego prawa obligacyjnego [Polish Code of Obligations of 1933: Origin, Sources, and Signifi cance for 
the European Law of Obligations], “Roczniki Nauk Prawnych” 2001, vol. 11, issue 1, p. 47; J.S. Petraniuk, 
Zarys charakterystyki prawa zobowiązań na tle polskiego systemu prawa cywilnego [An Outline of the Law 
of Obligations in the Context of the Polish Civil Law System] [in:] Synteza prawa polskiego, 1918–1939 
[A Comprehensive Handbook of Polish Law, 1918–1939], eds. T. Guz, J. Głuchowski, M. Pałubska, Warsza-
wa 2013, p. 422 and 455; S. Płaza, Historia prawa w Polsce na tle porównawczym [A Comparative History 
of Law in Poland], part 3: Okres międzywojenny, [The Interwar Period], Kraków 2001, p. 161. 
3  For example, Court of Appeal in Cracow, Judgment of 11 September 2012, I ACa 757/12; and District 
Court in Łódź, judgments of 31 March 2014, X GC 635/11, and 13 November 2015, X GC 282/14 (cf. website 
orzeczenia.ms.gov.pl). Cf. also A. Moszyńska, Z. Naworski, Rola nauk historycznoprawnych w orzecznictwie 
współczesnego wymiaru sprawiedliwości [The Role of Legal History in Contemporary Judicial Decisions] 
“Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa” 2015, vol. 8, issue 1, p. 96 ff .
4  M. Bieniak, Zasady dobrej wiary i uczciwego obrotu oraz swobody umów w kodeksie zobowiązań oraz 
zasadach europejskiego prawa umów [The Principles of Good Faith, “Fair Dealing”, and Freedom of Con-
tract in the (Polish) Code of Obligations and in the Principles of European Contract Law], “Studia Prawnicze” 
2008 vol. 4 (178), p. 49–58; A. Falkowska, Szwajcarski kodeks zobowiązań w pracach Komisji Kodyfi kacyj-
nej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w okresie dwudziestolecia międzywojennego [The Swiss Code of Obligations in 
the Work of the Polish Codifi cation Committee in the Interwar Period], “Studia Iuridica Toruniensia” 2008, 
vol. 4, p. 57–67; L. Górnicki, Metoda opracowania i koncepcja kodeksu zobowiązań z 1934 roku, p. 79–94; 
G. Jędrejek, Polski kodeks zobowiązań z 1933 roku, p. 47–68, J.S. Petraniuk, Zarys charakterystyki prawa 
zobowiązań, p. 406 ff ; A. Stawarska-Rippel, Kodeks zobowiązań w pierwszych latach Polski Ludowej [Code 
of Obligations in the Early Years of the Communist Poland], “Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego” 2004, issue 3, 
p. 697–716. 
5  R. Longchamps de Bérier, Nienależne świadczenie [Undue Payment] [in:] Encyklopedia podręczna 
prawa prywatnego [Concise Encyclopedia of Private Law], Warszawa [1936], vol. 2, p. 1075.
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presented here from a jurisprudential and a comparative perspective. The latter will in-
clude the Napoleonic Code (1804, hereafter CN), the Austrian Allgemeines Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (1811, hereafter ABGB), the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (1900, here-
after BGB), the Swiss Obligationenrecht (1911, hereafter OR) and a draft Code des obli-
gations et des contrats franco-italien (1927, hereafter COFI).6 At some points references 
will also be made to Roman Law and the Polish Civil Code of 1964 (hereafter KC).
2. Structural issues
The concept of undue payment is closely connected wih the provision concerning unjust 
enrichment. The latter was covered in the Polish Civil Code by a general rule which 
required the restoration of [that which constituted] unjust enrichment (Article 123: 
“Whoever unlawfully gained a benefi t from the property of another person is required 
to restore to the claimant that benefi t in kind, or, if this is not possible, its equivalent in 
cash”). The rule draws on the regulations of the German and Swiss codes (§812 BGB 
and Article 62 OR respectively); similar formulas can be found in §1041 ABGB7 and 
Article 73 COFI. Although the clause was missing from French and Russian legislation 
and jurisprudence, they worked out mechanisms that were not dissilmilar.8
To codify unjust enrichment, the legislator can either, following the Roman tradi-
tion9 expand it to encompass undue payment (§§812–822 BGB; Articles 62–67 OR; 
6  These codes were carefully studied by the authors of the Polish Code of Obligations. Besides, some 
codes were still in force in some parts of Poland in the interwar period, e.g. the CN (Book II and III) in the 
former Congress Kingdom of Poland, ABGB and BGB in those parts of Poland that used to be incorporated 
into the Austria-Hungary and Prussia respectively. From 1922 onwards ABGB replaced uncodifi ed Hungar-
ian law on the territory of Spisz and Orawa. Russian law, esp. Part I of Vol. X of the Digest of Laws of the 
Russian Empire (1835) was all the time in force in the east of Poland. Cf. S. Płaza, Historia prawa w Polsce 
na tle porównawczym, vol. III, p. 34 and 160.
7  Recently P. Księżak, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie: art. 405–414 KC: komentarz [Unjust Enrichment: 
Articles 405–414 KC: a Commentary], Warszawa 2007, p. 21, has denied the existence of a general caluse 
in Austrian law. In the interwar period §1041 ABGB was regarded as a general rule supporting a legal con-
struct called “profi table use” similar to unjust enrichment. Cf. L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań. 
Komentarz teoretyczno-praktyczny. Część ogólna [Institutions of the Code of Obligations: a Theoretical 
and Practical Commentary. General Part], Warszawa 1936, Issue 3, p. 565; Uzasadnienie projektu Kodeksu 
zobowiązań z uwzględnieniem ostatecznego tekstu kodeksu [Rationale for the Draft Code of Obligations Tak-
ing into Account the Final Version of the Text of the Code], ed. R. Longchamps de Bérier, Commission on 
Codifi cation, Subcommission on the Law of Obligations, issues 4–6, Warszawa 1936, p. 175 (herafter as 
Uzasadnienie). 
8  W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie [Unjust Enrichment] [in:] Encyklopedia podręczna prawa pry-
watnego, [Concise Encyclopedia of Private Law], Warszawa [1931], vol. 1, p. 108–111.
9  Cf. M. Sobczyk, Zamierzony cel świadczenia nie został osiągnięty (condictio ob rem). Przykład 
przydatności myśli jurystów rzymskich dla wykładni przepisów kodeksu cywilnego [The Intended Purpose 
of the Benefi t was not Achieved (condictio ob rem): An Example of the Relevance Roman Jurists for the 
Interpretation of the Provisions of the Civil Code], “Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego” 2004, issue 4, p. 1012. 
He claims that on the whole the Roman action of unjust enrichment corresponds with the modern action of 
undue payment.
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and Articles 405–414 KC10) or treat the two as discrete bodies of law (§§1041 and 1432 
ff . ABGB; also French doctrine and COFI).11 In the Polish Code of Obligations unjust 
enrichment (Articles 123-127) and undue payment (Articles 128–133) are entered sepa-
rately in Section II: Obligations Arising from Other Sources. Articles 128–130 specify 
the circumstances justifying a claim for the restoration of an unjustly appropriated ben-
efi t; Art. 131 and 132 introduce the exceptions; and, fi nally, Article 133 contains refer-
ences to the rules concerning unjust enrichment (§1) and a clause extending the liability 
of the accipiens in case he was aware of irregularity of his dealings (§2). The KZ also 
indicates that the latter action can only be granted with regard to private transactions; 
taxes and levies are expressly declared out of bounds.12
The Code’s separation of the two actions refl ects the standpoint of Longchamps de 
Bérier. He concedes that unjust enrichment and undue payment usually go hand in hand 
(even if the former results from the latter), yet, he insists, there are also situations when 
this is not the case. For example, suppose a mail order company (the solvens) sends you 
a book you have not ordered, asking you to return it in case you do not accept the off er. 
If you (formally the accipiens) do not accept the off er, the book does not become your 
property. Enrichment has not taken place, and yet it does not invalidate in the least the 
solvens’s demand that the goods be returned. Alfred Ohanowicz has little patience with 
this ambiguity. In his view, the goods either become the accipiens’s property, a state of 
aff airs that qualifi es automatically as enrichment, or, if he does not accept the transfer as 
a benefi t, i.e. there is no co-operation on his part, the performance simply has not taken 
place. Either of the two authors pauses to dicuss the example of a piano player foregoing 
to play the instrument on the mistaken belief that he was obliged not to disturb his neigh-
bour. Here, for once, they agree that this uncalled for display of self-restraint constitutes 
an act of undue payment which does not result in unjust enrichment. Yet it remains a true 
legal conundrum. The transfer did take place, but it is impossible to make out what ex-
actly the accipiens should or can return to the pianist.13
The majority of lawyers believe that in essence undue payment is no diff erent from 
unjust enrichment. They see in undue payment a variant of unjust enrichment in a situ-
ation when the solvens seeks redress for lost benefi ts he conferred upon the defendant 
10  A. Ohanowicz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie [Unjust Enrichment] [in:] System prawa cywilnego [The 
System of Civil Law], vol. 3, part 1: Prawo zobowiązań. Część ogólna [Law of Obligations: General Part], 
Ossolineum 1981, p. 493. For the opposite view cf. P. Księżak, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 168; he argues 
that the two procedural tools (de lege lata) are kept apart.
11  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 543–544 and 565–566; P. Księżak, Bezpodstawne 
wzbogacenie, p. 21 and 24–25; W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 74–75, 78 and 86; A. Ohanowicz, 
Niesłuszne wzbogacenie [Unjust Enrichment], Warszawa 1956, p. 177; Uzasadnienie, p. 175. Domański 
maintains that Austrian law makes hardly any distinction between unjust enrichment and undue payment. 
However, that is contradicted by the fact that they are separated in the Code and that each has its own sched-
ule of liabilities. In French jurisdiction there has been a tradional distinction between unjust enrichment that 
resulted from undue payment (Articles 1235, and 1376–1381 CN) and other cases where the claims are mod-
elled on the Roman actio de in rem verso.
12  In: Supreme Court Judgment Zb.830/34 (in J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz dla 
praktyki [Code of Obligations: a Commentary for Practical Use], vol. 1: Część ogólna: art. 1–293 [General 
Part: Articles 1–293], Łódź 1949, s. 189). 
13  R. Longchamps de Bérier, Nienależne świadczenie, s. 1075, A. Ohanowicz, Niesłuszne wzbogacenie, 
p. 59–60 and 249; idem, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 495. 
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in the belief (animo solvendi) that he was fulfi lling an obligation, but the obligation did 
not exist. In all other cases of unjust enrichment the state of mind of the solvens is ir-
relevant.14 Intent (animo solvendi) would therefore have to be the distinctive feature of 
undue payment; however, we cannot be too sure as Art. 133, Point 3 which admits some 
restituition claims for acts performed with no specifi c intent. The problem did not escape 
the attention of the commentators. Whereas Ignacy Rosenblüth drew attention to the fact 
that “the condictiones listed in Art. 128–133  do not consist in the enrichment but in  the 
performance’s absence of basis”, Ludwik Domański argues that undue payment retains 
its distinctive character only within the law of obligations, while unjust enrichment oc-
curs in many areas of law, e.g. material law, family law, inheritance law, etc.15
3. Legal ground in claims for restitution
The legal rules detemining the criteria of admissibility of claims for restitution are usu-
ally discussed in connection with the Roman system of condictiones. Although contem-
porary systems of law no longer mirror the classical approach to undue payment, the 
echoes of the Roman law still resound in today’s rules.
In the interwar law publications the condictiones were presented within the civil code 
framework, with the Roman terms in brackets. Ludwik Domański’s commentary on the 
Code of Obligations was the only exception to that rule.16 He groups the actions in resti-
tution under three heads: a) condictio indebiti (recovery of what was paid or delivered to 
another in error), b) condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam (if the fulfi lment of obliga-
tion violates a legal or moral norm the claim is deemed invalid); c) condictio ob causam 
datorum, sive causa data, causa non secuta, vel fi nita (recovery of what was given to 
another in anticipation of an act providing a legal justifi cation of the transfer or if such an 
act had existed but became invalid). To round off  this typology he adds the fourth head-
ing, condictio sine causa (recovery of what was obtained by the accipiens without any 
legal cause, or grounds recognized by the law).
14  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 567 and 573; S. Goldberger, Niesłuszne zbogacenie 
w Kodeksie zobowiązań [Unjust Enrichment in the Code of Obligations], “Głos Adwokatów” 1938, No. 2–4, 
p. 55; J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań, p. 180, 187–188; I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, 
Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, [Code of Obligations: a Commentary] Kraków 1934, p. 245; Uzasadnienie, 
pp.178 and 182; F. Zoll Jr, Zobowiązania w zarysie według polskiego Kodeksu zobowiązań [Obligations 
According to the Polish Code of Obligations: an Outline], Warszawa 1948, p.114. In this context the Supreme 
Court Judgment of 15 May 1946, C.II. 92/46 must appear highly controversial (cf. W. Święcicki, Orzecznic-
two powojenne Sądu Najwyższego w sprawach cywilnych: 30 VI 1945 r. – 30 VI 1947 r. [Postwar judgments 
in civil cases: 30 June 1945 – 30 June 1947], Łódź 1948, p. 92–94). The dispute was triggered by a defective 
entry in the Land Registry, which arose from a technical fault in the underlying notary act. The buyer, who 
was co-owner of the property, was registered as an owner. Although this type of substitution hardly qualifi es 
as a transfer of benefi t within the meaning of Article 2, the court treated it as a case of undue payment (unjust 
enrichment would have been more apt). 
15  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p.566 and 573; I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Ro-
senblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 245.
16  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 573 ff .
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In this study the condictiones will be discussed in the order dictated by the time 
lapse between the moment of the cessation of the legal cause and the moment of the 
contested transfer taking place. Articles 128 and 130 deal with situations when the claim 
was invalid ab initio, already at the moment of the transfer, because the legal cause was 
either totally absent or void. This is the ground covered by the Roman condictio indebiti, 
condictio ob turpem causam, condictio ob iniustam causam, and in a way condictio sine 
causa. Art. 129 brings together two types of circumstances. At the beginning it refers to 
situations when the legal cause was valid at the moment the transfer was performed, but 
later ceased to be valid or its validity was rescinded. This corresponds to the Roman con-
dictio causa fi nita. The second part of Art. 129 deals with situations when the contested 
transfer occurred while the legal cause, though missing, was expected to materialize or 
come into force in the future, but eventually failed to do so. This fi ts in well with the 
condictio causa data causa non secuta.
The term causa, which is crucial for these Roman maxims, has long been noted for its 
multiple meanings.17 The following three predominated in the interwar Civil Law litera-
ture: a/ causa effi  ciens, or the source of obligation, e.g. an affi  davit, a tort; b) causa im-
pulsive, or a personal motive which gives rise to an obligation (it includes causa remota, 
or a further aim of the obligation); c) causa fi nalis, or the legal basis of the obligation, i.e. 
the contractual agreement between two or more persons; the performance of the obliga-
tion (real contracts); or the disposition to transfer goods or benefi ts to the possession of 
another on a gratuitous basis. Causa fi nalis was also treated as causa proxima, determin-
ing the direct aim or purpose of the obligation. In the case of gratuitous obligations causa 
proxima and causa remota were indistinguishable.18
The term “legal ground” appears only in Art.129, in which condictio causa fi nita 
could actually represent causa effi  ciens (e.g. the repeal of a legal norm concerning a cer-
tain kind of property transfer). Moreover, in context condictio causa data causa non 
secuta could mean causa effi  ciens or causa fi nalis depending on whether the focus is on 
the fulfi lment of the obligation by the solvens in anticipation of the conclusion of a con-
tract or the reception of the matching obligation respectively. It seems that the former 
is fully justifi ed. In the circumstances described in Art. 128 and Art. 130 the claim was 
based on the absence of causa effi  ciens (the parties were not bound by contract, i.e. con-
dictio indebiti, condictio ob inuistam causam) or causa impulsiva (the contract between 
the parties envisaged an illegal or immoral outcome, i.e. condictio ob turpem causam).
The proper positioning of condictio sine causa in the system of condictions is a major 
problem. Here, we have taken the view that it is not necessary to employ that maxim 
in the discussion of claims of unjust payment. In cases where the obligation was to be 
voided Roman law had at its disposal the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam and 
condictio sine causa, which clinched the system of  condictiones. The latter was used 
when none of the other condictions could eff ectively be used in a case of enrichment that 
was by all accounts unjust, especially when the legal system off ered no causa fi t for that 
purpose. It is exteremely diffi  cult to demarcate the domain of condictio sine causa or to 
17  J. Sondel lists 27 meanings of “causa” in his Słownik łacińsko-polski dla prawników i historyków 
[Latin-Polish Dictionary for Lawyers and Historians], Kraków 2003. 
18  H. Fruchs, Causa debendi w Kodeksie zobowiązań [Causa debendi in the Code of Obligation] “Nowy 
Kodeks Zobowiązań” 1934, No. 24, p. 90–92. 
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set out how it relates to other condictions. What complicates the problem of condictio 
sine causa even more, apart from its own fuzzy nature, is the history of the condictions 
in general. Prior to their introduction to Byzantine lawyers their names were unknown to 
classic Roman law.19 According to Fryderyk Zoll Sr, the term condictio sine causa cov-
ered both claims that were invalid ab initio as well claims that became invalidated after 
the initial transaction (which is tantamount to condictio causa fi nita).20 
In his analysis of the concept of unjust enrichment in Austria and in France Wiktor 
Lenz notes that condictio sine causa has no clear scope and is used as a supplementary 
remedy, especially in hard cases involving invalid contracts. He also points out that in 
the legal systems of those countries the border between condictio indebiti and condictio 
sine causa is based on the distinction between undue payment ex personis and ex re. The 
solvens who transfered the benefi t directly to the wrong accipiens (i.e. who was not the 
legitimate creditor) could take advantage of the condictio indebiti. If, however, there was 
no debt, he could make use of another condiction, for example condictio sine causa.21
About the extent to which the Polish Code of Obligations shadowed the condictions 
opinions were divided. Fryderyk Zoll Jr is sure condictio sine causa could be discerned 
in Art. 130.22 Ludwik Domański goes even further and declares that “the right to demand 
the restoration of unjust enrichment in Articles 123–127 refl ects the condictio sine causa 
in general”. On the other hand, Roman Longchamps de Bérier and Ignacy Rosenbluth 
never even mention that condiction in their commentaries.23 
Fryderyk Zoll Jr illustrates the application of condictio sine causa with a situation 
when a sum of money changes hands whereby the solvens is convinced that it is a loan 
while the accipiens thinks it is a gift. Wiktor Lentz invokes the same example as an 
instance of condictio indebiti because indebitum presupposes an understanding, shared 
by both parties, that a transfer of benefi ts has taken place.24 It seems, however, that to 
19  W. Dajczak, T. Giaro, F. Longchamps de Bérier, Prawo rzymskie. U podstaw prawa prywatnego [Ro-
man Law: the Foundations of Private Law], Warszawa 2009, p. 522–523.
20  W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 68–69; M. Sobczyk, Zamierzony cel świadczenia nie został 
osiągnięty, p. 1015 (it applies equally to condictio causa fi nita); F. Zoll Sr, Pandekta, czyli nauka rzymskiego 
prawa prywatnego [Pandecta, or a Compendium of Roman Private Law], vol. 3: Zobowiązania [Obligations], 
Kraków 1910, p. 201–202.
21  W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 80 and 91–92. 
22  F. Zoll Jr, Zobowiązania w zarysie, p. 115; cf. also A. Fischler, Condictiones według polskiego 
Kodeksu zobowiązań [Condictiones According to the Polish Code of Obligations’], “Przegląd Sądowy” 1934, 
No. 5, p. 140; P. Księżak, Świadczenie niegodziwe [Turpitudinous Benefi ts], Warszawa 2007, p. 94 (De lege 
lata); idem, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 175 and 198–200, notes the use of condictio sine causa in situ-
ations when the transfer of the benefi t was based on an invalid legal act. He argues that here, unlike those 
cases that come within the ambit of condictio indebiti, the condition of the solvens’ misapprehension of the 
nonexistece of debt is not met. Legal scholarship fi nds that the boundary betwen the two condictions is all but 
clear (P. Mostowik, in: System prawa prywatnego [The System of Private Law], vol. 6: Prawo zobowiązań – 
część ogólna [Law of obligations – general part], ed. A. Olejniczak, Warszawa 2009, p. 310; A. Ohanowicz, 
Niesłuszne wzbogacenie, p. 219–220). 
23  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 573; R. Longchamps de Bérier, Nienależne świad-
czenie; idem, Zobowiązania [Obligations], Lwów 1939; I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Ko-
deks zobowiązań. Komentarz; However, Uzasadnienie, p. 182, treats condictio indebiti, condictio sine causa 
and condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam jointly as actions that could be brought when the legal ground 
was missing at the time of the transfer.  
24  W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 99; F. Zoll Jr, Zobowiązania w zarysie, p. 116.
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resolve the case within the framework of the Polish law of obligations Article 128 would 
be more appropriate than Article 130, which Zoll Jr associates with condictio sine causa. 
He points out that the solvens and the accipiens in this example cannot be said to have 
reached an agreement. Consequently, to declare the obligation void (Article 130) would 
miss the point when in fact there never was an obligation (Article 128). In brief, a case 
of mutually exclusive claims like the one above is best served by Article 128.
Finally, we should mention some of the remaining condictions known to Roman law. 
The condictio causa furtiva for the recovery of stolen property from the thief had the 
character of a criminal prosecution; the condictio possesionis was an instrument for the 
restitution of a thing obtained by way of unjust enrichment; and the condictio scripturae 
allowed the debtor to demand the return of the written admission of debt (the chirograph) 
if the obligation to repay debt was discharged or if the promised loan was not paid out 
by the solvens. The scope of the Roman condictions was broader than that of the modern 
concept of unjust enrichment.25 
4. No legal ground at the time of the transfer of benefits
The Roman equivalents of the provisions of Art. 128 and 130 of the Polish Code of 
Obligations are condictio indebiti, condictio ob turpem causam, condictio ob iniustam 
causam and possibly condictio sine causa.26 Among the laws that were in force on the 
territory of the new Polish state before 1918 we can fi nd analogous constructions in the 
CN (where condictio indebiti is described as payment of undue debt, payement de l’indû, 
in Articles 1235 and  1376–1381; condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam is embedded 
in case-law analogous to  Art. 1131)27, ABGB (§§1431 i 877), BGB (§812); likewise in 
Swiss law (Art. 62, para. 2 OR) and in COFI (Articles 66–72). The Digest of Laws of 
the Russian Empire does not contain such regulations; the appropriate legal norms were 
shaped by judicial decisions.28
Of the two articles of the KZ, the hypothesis of Article 128 has a broader scope than 
that of Article 130. Art. 128, para. 1 in fi ne dismisses the existence of an obligation (“he 
was under no obligation”), while Article 130 deals with cases where the obligation is 
declared invalid. In other words, the situations covered by Art. 130 are within the scope 
of Article 128 for the hypothesis of the nonexistence of obligation encompasses the hy-
pothesis of the invadity of obligation.
25  W. Dajczak, T. Giaro, F. Longchamps de Bérier, Prawo rzymskie, p. 523, W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne 
wzbogacenie, p. 103 and 107; A. Ohanowicz, Niesłuszne wzbogacenie., p. 16-17; and M. Sobczyk, Zamierzo-
ny cel świadczenia nie został osiągnięty, p. 1013.
26  Article 128 §1. A person who transferred a benefi t to perform an obligation has the right to de-
mand the restoration of the benefi t unless at the time of the transfer was under no obligation to the ac-
cipiens. §2. A person who performed the obligation before the date it due may not demand restititution.
Article 130. The invalidity of he obligation gives rise to the duty of restoration of the obtained benefi t unless 
the obligation became valid after the performance of the obligation.
27  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 574–575. 
28  Ibidem, p. 574; W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 108–111.
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In his report for the legislative committee Roman Longchamps de Bérier argues that 
the provisions of Art. 130 need a separate head because they have legal consequences 
that are diff erent in kind from those of Article 132 (where in case of condictio ob turpem 
vel iniustam causam the claim of restitution is ruled out) or Article 131, para. 3 (which 
lowers the barriers for a restitution claim).29 This is hardly convincing. Art. 131, para. 3 
and Article 132 refer expressis verbis neither to Article 128 nor to Article 130. Moreover, 
the provisions of latter do not anticipate consequences that are diff erent from those of 
Article 128. 
One may wonder if the reason for dividing the condictions between Article 128 and 
Article 130 is in fact de Bérier’s intention to rule out the demand for restoration in situ-
ations when “the obligation became valid after the performance of the obligation” (Art. 
130 in fi ne). An example which demonstrates the point of such a distinction is the de-
livery of a gift to make up for the consequences of a fl awed contract (Art. 358, para. 2). 
As Art. 128 refers to the nonexistence of obligation and Article 130 to a vitiated obliga-
tion, the fi nal phrase of Art. 130 about convalidation could refer solely to cases within 
the scope of that article. You can convalidate or put to rights an act which is vitiated, 
but you cannot amend something that does not exist. At the same time, however, the 
Uzasadnienie concedes that the formula from Article 130 in fi ne is not requisite because 
in an action for the return of the object of undue payment the defendant can come up with 
the claim that the restoration, should it be carried out, was not fi nal as long as the initial 
act of obligation could still be pronounced valid.30
a) A nonexistent (void) obligation: condictio indebiti
Article 128 gives the right to demand the restoration of undue payment to the person that 
“at the time of the transfer was under no obligation to the accipiens” (§1 in fi ne). As we 
have argued earlier, the hypothesis of Article 128 encompasses also cases of invalid obli-
gations from Article 130. Article 128 would then be employed in cases when the transfer 
was carried out to fulfi ll the obligation (animo solvendi).31 If we are to take our cue from 
the Roman jurisdiction this condiction should only be used with regard to benefi ts con-
ferred within the system of nominate contracts prescribed by law. In all other cases, i.e. 
when the benefi t transfer was based on an innominate contract, the right choice would be 
the condictio causa data causa non secuta.32
The meaning of “benefi t” (Pol. “świadczenie”, Ger. “Leistung”) in this legal context 
is very extensive; it includes every description of action or omission to act as well as the 
29  R. Longchamps de Bérier, Zobowiązania, p. 223–224. 
30  Uzasadnienie, p. 184–185. 
31  For a diff erent view cf. I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komen-
tarz, p. 256. He claims that Article 128 was also applied in cases where the benefi t was conferred to put the 
other side under obligation (animo obligandi), e.g. by an advance payment. Let’s note, however, that such 
situations are covered by Article 129, while Article 128 clearly refers to animo solvendi (“to perform an 
obligation”).
32  P. Księżak, Świadczenie niegodziwe, p. 9.
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contraction of various obligations like issuing promissory notes or warranties, etc.33 Of 
all the legal systems under consideration only German law permits expressis verbis the 
plaintiff  to avail himself of a condiction even when the obligation has been discharged 
(§812 II BGB). The functionality of this arrangement appears to be connected with the 
relatively abstract nature of the German legal procedure.34 Some legal system, including 
the CN and COFI,  conceptualize the problem of disputed (undue) obligations in terms 
of payment of debt (as e.g. Article 1235 CN). That shuts out, or makes it very diffi  cult 
to bring in, the condictio indebiti, which covers all kinds of benefi ts, services or favours, 
giving rise to the liability for unjust enrichment.35
The Polish Code of Obligations makes room for actions based on condictio indebiti 
(Article 128). It can be fi led by a solvens if there was no debt in the fi rst place (inde-
bitum) or if there was a valid contract but the solvens was not the debtor, the accipiens 
was not the creditor, and none of them acted as a representative, contractor, negotiorum 
gestor, etc. In the tripartite model invoving a solvens as the apparent debtor, an accipiens 
as creditor and a third party who is the accipiens’ real debtor, the claim for the restitution 
of undue payment should be directed against the accipiens who received the payment 
(expressis verbis Article 1377 I CN). In French jurisdiction (Article 1377 II KN) the sol-
vens is entitled to pursue his claim against the real debtor if in consequence of payments 
the latter, acting in good faith, has destroyed the records of the debt history, or – given 
the subsequent judicial decisions – has let go of the pledge. If the solvens discharged the 
debt directly to the accipiens for the benefi t of a third party under a mistaken belief that 
he was obliged to do it, he is not permitted to use a condiction to sue the accipiens. He 
has, instead, the right to bring an action in unjustifi ed enrichment against that third par-
ty.36 Making condictio indebiti unavailable to the accipiens has been justifi ed by the fact 
that he got what – on the basis of an agreement with the third party – he was entitled to. 
At the same time the solvens carried on doing what he wrongly thought he ought to for 
the sake of the third party. However, as the benefi ts did not in fact pass from the solvent 
to the third party, the restoration claim has to be based on unjust enrichment rather than 
the condictio indebiti. If the roles were altered, i.e. the solvens who was the real debtor 
passed on the (undue) benefi ts to an accipiens who was not the true creditor, the condic-
tion would be the proper instrument for the solvens and unjust enrichment for the true 
creditor.
Condictio indebiti could also be used in cases when there was a debt agreement be-
tween the solvens and the accipiens, but the delivered goods or services were diff erent 
33  E.g. the Supreme Court heard a case of conferred benefi t which consisted in entering into an obligation 
by issuing promissory notes (Judgment of 21 September 1934, C.I. 481/34; discussed below in Section 7c). 
34  For a discussion of the signifi cance of claims in unjust enrichment in a system of law which admits 
abstract juristic acts cf. J. Halberda, Instytucja niesłusznego zbogacenia w Kodeksie zobowiązań z 1933 r. na 
tle współczesnych kodyfi kacji [Unjust Enrichment in the Polish Code of Obligations of 1933 in a Comparative 
Perspective], “Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa” 2012, vol. 5, issue 4, p. 312–313.
35  S. Meier, Restitution in Case of Undue Transfer [in:] The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European 
Private Law, Oxford 2012, vol. II, p. 1471.
36  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 575–576; W.Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 
69, 79, 91, 94; I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 258. In the 
context of the KC, cf. A. Ohanowicz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 490.
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from those that had been promised.37 It would likewise be applicable in cases of alternate 
obligation when the solvens, unmindful of the terms, did not make a choice or delivered 
the things on both sides of the disjunction (as in the explicit wording of §1436 ABGB), 
or when the solvens, unaware of the option to substitute a secondary obligation for the 
primitive one, fulfi lled the latter.38 The undue obligation on the part of the solvens could 
refer to a part of a discharged obligation. For example, the obligation to pay amounted to 
100 zł, but the sum actually paid was 110 zł. 
Cases of discharged obligation by a solvens who was unaware of the plea of peremp-
tory exception (except when it enforced a natural obligation) are treated in the Code of 
Obligations in the same way as cases of nonexistent debt. Furthermore, condictio inde-
biti could also be invoked in a claim born out of a conditional obligation when either the 
resolutory condition or the suspensive condition came into being before the obligation 
was discharged (Article 46 §2).
Not all actions could take advantage of condictio indebiti; the exclusions were sub-
ject of specifi c regulations. So for instance the claim for the recovery of a payment dis-
charged before it fell due, i.e. prematurely, or before a reciprocal payment by the other 
party, is declared not actionable in Article 128 §2. Analogous regulations can be found 
in the legal systems of other countries (cf. Art. 1186, para. 2 CN; §1434 in fi ne ABGB; 
§813 II BGB; and Art. 411, point 4 of the Civil Code). The rationale for this restriction 
is clear to see – the debtor would have to fulfi ll his obligation in due course anyway. The 
only exception form this rule – known also to Austrian, French and German law – is the 
premature payment by a solvens who lacks the capacity to enter into legal agreements.39
The exclusion of the claim for the recovery of undue payment described in Art. 128, 
para. 2 does not apply to situations when the discharge of obligation was obtained by 
deceit, threat or the solvent was a victim of exploitation (Articles 39–43). In these cir-
cumstances the claimant could resort to the condictio indebiti unless – and that was the 
only exception – the time for the discharge of the obligation had run out. Then the only 
course of action left to the solvens is to fi le a claim for damages (Article 134 ff ).40
b) An invalid obligation – condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam
As we have said earlier, the cases obligations rendered invalid (Article 130) are sub-
sumed under the hypothesis of the nonexistence of obligation (Article 128). The absence 
of obligation at the moment of transferring the benefi t gives rise to the duty of returning 
whatever was obtained (Article 130 in principio). In Roman law the party disadvantaged 
by following through on an invalid agreement has a choice of three condictions, ob 
turpem causam, ob iniustam causam, and, possibly, sine causa. The fi rst and the second 
37  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 576, adds that the transfer of another benefi t by the 
debtor acting with the consent of the creditor results in the extinguishment of the obligation (Article 207 in 
principio).
38  W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 100. 
39  Ibidem, s. 100; Uzasadnienie, p. 183–184. Under Polish law the payment of debt by a minor was ef-
fective (see below, Section 7 a).
40  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 577. 
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constitute a subset of condictio causa data causa non secuta, in which it does not matter 
whether the purpose was achieved or not.41
According to KZ the duty of restitution lapses if “the obligation after being dis-
charged has become valid” (Article 130 in fi ne). The examples can be found in specifi c 
regulations, eg. the defect of legal incapacity can be cured by the confi rmation of the 
contract by a person with legal authority to act on behalf of the minor (Article 53) and 
the defects of an ad solemnitatem formula by the performance of a donation  (Article 
358, para. 2).
Article 130 is connected with the provision of Article 56 that “contracts contrary to 
public order, an act of law, or good customs are invalid”. However, Article 132 restricts 
the right of action to a solvens who is guilty of illegal or immoral conduct. To sum up: 
the solvens could resort to condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam (Article 130) only 
when the transfer of benefi ts had no legal justifi cation because the obligation was invalid 
under Article 56 and at the same time the situation was not covered by the hypothesis of 
Article 132. 
In Roman law the condictio ob turpem causam is used to allow the solvens to recover 
benefi ts from an accipiens whose continued possession of them would violate the values 
of morality, equity and decency, and would thus be unacceptable. KZ takes the same line 
in cases involving the restitution of a conferred benefi t whose aim was to induce the ac-
cipiens to the omission of an illegal act.42 Although there would be nothing wrong with 
the solvents’ intention nor the act itself, handing out rewards for not committing illegal 
acts “off ends our moral sense and undermines the legal order [and so] makes the whole 
contract serve an immoral aim”.43 Exceptionally, the claim for recovery can be allowed 
if the benefi t changed hands on the understanding that there existed no obligation. Such 
a situation is described in Article 131, point 3: “if in order to get approval of a request 
that is right and proper an applicant gives a bribe to an offi  cial who has given him to 
understand that without it he would  have to wait for a decision that may never come”.44 
The question whether the bribe achieved its purpose or not is in this case immaterial. 
However, KZ denies the use of the condiction ob turpem causam to a solvent who acted 
with an illegal or immoral intention, for example a giver who bribed an offi  cial on order 
to get a licence, or who paid rent for premises used for prostitution and illegal gambling. 
In Roman law the condictio ob iniustam causam applies in situations where the reten-
tion of the benefi t by the accipiens would be wrong, but not on account of immorality or 
breach of good customs. The most common examples when this condiction was granted 
included the reclamation of a marital gift, a prize in an illegal game, and proceeds of 
usury.45
Article 130 treats the claim for the recovery of undue payment – comparable to the 
Roman condictio ob iniustam causam – in a situation where the solvens discharged his 
41  P. Księżak, Świadczenie niegodziwe, p. 11; M. Sobczyk, Zamierzony cel świadczenia nie został osiąg-
nięty, p. 1015. 
42  W. Dajczak, T. Giaro, F. Longchamps de Bérier, Prawo rzymskie, p. 522–523; P. Księżak, Świadczenie 
niegodziwe, p. 14.
43  R. Longchamps de Bérier, Nienależne świadczenie, p. 1079. 
44  Ibidem, p. 1079. 
45  F. Zoll Sr, Pandekta, p. 200. On the diffi  culties of establishing the scope of that condiction, cf. P. 
Księżak, Świadczenie niegodziwe, p. 21. 
1-łamanie z specjalny.indd   74 2017-12-15   15:03:54
75
Artykuły – Articles
part of an obligation (agreement, legal act) that was nonexistent, invalid, or possibly de-
fective. Here are some specifi c examples illustrating the range of its applications:
– the contract was invalid because its object or purpose was contrary to public order, 
the law,46 good customs; or it demanded things impossible to perform (Article 56); 
or the required, validity-conferring formalities were not complied with (Article 
109)47 as a result of  false show or lack of good faith vitiating the promise (Articles 
31–34) or the admission of a person in a state of unconsciousness or under a dis-
ability;
– the legal act was invalidated because the declaration of will (affi  davit) was viti-
ated – it was was obtained by deceit, threat or the solvent was the victim of ex-
ploitation (Articles 39–43);48
– the legal act was incomplete – it was in need of confi rmation, for example by 
a person with legal authority to act on behalf of the minor who entered into the 
agreement (Article 53) represented by a person without power of attorney (Article 
101).49
5. Invalid legal ground – condictio causa finita
For our discussion of the condictiones we have assumed a single criterion, namely the 
point in time at which the performance took place. In those discussed so far the legal 
justifi cation was nonexistent already at the moment of payment (transfer of the benefi t). 
The following analyses will focus on two remaining variants – the legal ground ceased 
to be valid as the performance was taking place, or, the cessation occurred afterwards 
(Article 129 in principio). The latter includes the situation when the legal ground was 
expected to come into being in the future, but failed to materialize (Article 129 in fi ne)50. 
The provisions of Article 129 in principio corresponds to the Roman condictio causa 
fi nita (condictio ob causam fi nitam) and analogous regulations in ABGB (§§921, 1435 
and 1447), BGB (§812) and OR (Article 62, para. 2). In French law the condiction was 
46  In 1936 the Supreme Court ruled in a case  brought by a tenant who wanted to recover that part of his 
payment that exceeded the ceiling set down in legislation imposing caps on rent levels (Supreme Court Judg-
ment of 30 November 1936, C.III. 51/35 (in: J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań, p. 188–189).
47  Z. Fenichel, Nieważność umowy z braku formy piśmiennej (notarialnej) a odpowiedzialność stron 
[Contract Invalidity Due to the Absence of Formal (Notarized) Agreement and the Problem of Liability], 
“Przegląd Notarialny” 1937, No. 11, p. 8; A. Fischler, Condictiones według polskiego Kodeksu zobowiązań, 
p. 141. It was the factor of actual facts of the case that bore down on the ruling of the Supreme Court of 21 
January 1947, C.II 513/46 (in: W. Święcicki, Orzecznictwo powojenne Sądu Najwyższego, p. 158–161). 
48  According to Wiktor Lenz it is not important whether the invalidation came about through a revocation 
or a judicial decision, or whether it took place before or after the transfer of the benefi t; what matters is that 
that works backwards, and clears up the fi eld ex tunc from the outset (cf. W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogace-
nie, p. 101–102). This interpretation, representative of the interwar consensus, is not shared by contemporary 
jurists who have hardly any doubt in assigning this case to the sphere of condictio causa fi nita (cf. P. Księżak, 
Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 182–184 and 187; and P. Mostowik [in:] System prawa prywatnego, p. 303).
49  J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań, p. 190–191.
50  Article 129. A person may demand the restitution of a transferred benefi t when the legal ground fell 
away or did not materialize because the envisaged purpose of the benefi t was not achieved.
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reconstructed by judicial decisions per analogiam to Articles 1376–1381 CN. The Digest 
of Laws of the Russian Empire does not accord it the status of a separate instrument.51 
Article 129 in principio is applied in cases when the legal ground existed at the mo-
ment of the transfer of the benefi t (causa preaterita), but was later knocked out (causa 
fi nita). Thus the condictio causa fi nita may be invoked when the benefi t was transferred 
on the basis of: 
– a legal norm which was later invalidated;52
– a judgment ordering enforcement which did not become fi nal, but was changed 
before coming into force (the same applies to administrative decisions);53 
– a conditional contract when the resolutory condition was met.54 The diff erence in 
the application of condictio causa fi nita and condictio indebiti is determined by 
the sequence of events (transfer of the benefi t and the fulfi lment of the condition). 
The former is applicable when the performance of the obligation took place be-
fore the condition came into being whereas the latter is used when the sequence 
was reversed (and consequently the obligation was invalidated prior to the perfor-
mance);
– a contract was cancelled (no matter whether the cancellation was to include all 
obligations ex tunc or merely those that were still pending, ex nunc), for example 
if an advance payment for future expenses was provided prior to the cancellation 
and a simultaneous claim for the recovery of the outstanding balance of the ad-
vance sum, or if an advance payment was followed by a cancellation or dissolution 
of the contract without recognizing the prepaid sum as discharged obligation;55
51  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 574 and W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 
108–111.
52  A. Ohanowicz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 491. Ludwik Domański distinguishes two types of le-
gal ground of obligations: a/ direct (e.g. a contract), and b/ indirect (e.g. a statute). He maintains that the con-
dictio causa fi nita is usually invoked in connection with the falling away of the indirect legal ground (when 
for example the parties had made a preliminary agreement for sale of a part of a plot of land but a new law 
came into force that prohibited a parcelling of real property as envisaged by the contract), while the condictio 
causa data causa non secuta is more appropriate for cases where the direct legal ground is invalidated. Cf. L. 
Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 578.
53  P. Księżak, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 185; W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 81, 92; 
A. Ohanowicz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 492; I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks 
zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 260.
54  P. Księżak, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 184; W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 80–81 and 
100–101; A. Ohanowicz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 491. In his list I. Rosenblüth (in: J. Korzonek, I. 
Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz., p. 260) adds also the case of non-occurrence of the suspensive 
condition; however, for W. Lenz this situation calls for condictio causa data causa non secuta rather than 
condictio causa fi nita.
55  P. Księżak, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p.182–184 and 188; P. Mostowik [in:] System prawa prywat-
nego, p. 305; A. Ohanowicz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 491; J.S. Petraniuk, Zarys charakterystyki prawa 
zobowiązań, p. 449; and I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz., p. 
260. In its Judgment of 17/25 March 1925, C.59/25, the Warsaw Court of Appeal ordered the restitution of 
the sum paid in advance under contract for the sale of real property in a situation where the contract could 
not be made eff ective without an offi  cial permission (cf. Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich, 1926, item 340, p. 
361–363). The judgment was based on the rules of the Digest of Laws of the Russian Empire.
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– a prenuptial agreement which specifi ed the amount and the terms of the dowry 
transferred from the bride’s parents upon her marrying, but the marriage that was 
later dissolved. 56
The only debatable issue here was right choice of condiction in the case of contract 
concellation when the accipiens’ performance became objectively (i.e. without his fault) 
impossible (Article 267). For, it can be argued, if the accipiens’ termination of an agree-
ment had ex nunc consequences, the condictio indebiti had no grip. Instead, the claim 
is to be matched with condictio causa fi nita or condictio causa data causa non secuta 
(which of them is up for debate). Ludwik Domański illustrates his argument with this 
example of a termination of lease: one month after signing the contract the tenant (the 
solvens), who had paid his rent in advance, decided to give notice because of faults or 
damage (e.g. a fi re) that made the premises untenantable (Article 376). In his opinion, it 
was a case of condictio causa data causa non secuta because the landlord (the accipiens) 
was unable to pass on the benefi t, a nonperformance which preconditioned the action 
of the tenant (the solvens). If the premises are damaged, the purpose of the transfer of 
benefi ts, i.e. allowing the tenant to make use the premises (Article 370), cannot be ac-
complished. The logic of this argument is based on the identifi cation of the causa in the 
wording of the condiction with the aim or purpose (causa fi nalis) of the accipiens’ per-
formance and not its legal ground (causa effi  ciens), i.e. the contract.57
Other authors take a diff erent view, which appears more convincing. They match the 
cases where the performance was frustrated after the contract had been made through 
no fault of either party with condictio causa fi nita. They insist that the causa should be 
construed as causa effi  ciens, i.e. the termination of the contract, and not a cancellation, 
which implies that the object or purpose of the mutual transaction became subsequently 
unattainable. They point out that the key word in Article 267 para. 1 is “wygasa” (“is 
extinguished”), and that cannot refer to anything but the contract, i.e. the causa effi  ciens. 
Consequently, the solvens is entitled to claim the recovery of the benefi t he had trans-
ferred before the contract was found non-binding. If, however,  the price was sent to the 
buyer, but the seller ran out of stock and was not able to deliver, Roman Longchamps de 
Bérier would grant the buyer the right to invoke condictio causa fi nita.58 Contemporary 
doctrine took great care to distinguish between situations where a contractual obligation 
became impossible to perform through no fault of either side from a move, available to 
a party to a contract, to cancel it and to demand restitution of the benefi ts already ren-
dered if the other party deferred the reciprocal delivery as agreed (Article 250ff ). In the 
latter case the failure to perform constitutes a breach of contract giving the non-breach-
ing party the right to seek redress in the courts. Under Article 129 in fi ne the claim for 
recovery could proceed in accordance with the instrument of unjust enrichment, focused 
on the accipiens’ liability (Article 127). In case of claims connected with the cancelation 
56  F. Zoll Jr, Zobowiązania w zarysie, p. 115.
57  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 578–579. 
58  R. Longchamps de Bérier, Nienależne świadczenie, p. 1077; J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań, p. 
189; Uzasadnienie, p. 182.
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of the contract (Article 250 ff .) the solvens is entitled to seek the restitution of all his 
contractual contributions as well as damages for delay.59
6. The purpose of the benefit transfer proved elusive – condictio 
causa data causa non secuta
If a benefi t was transferred in the expectation of attaining a certain goal and that goal 
was not attained, the action for the recovery of the transferred benefi t should invoke the 
provision of Article 129 in fi ne. It corresponds to condictio causa data causa non secuta 
(condictio causa data non secuta, condictio ob causam datorum, condictio ob rem da-
torum). In Roman law it does not matter why the causa lapsed.60 Of the legal codes that 
were in force in Poland in the interwar period only the German BGB includes the con-
dictio causa data causa non secuta in §812 (likewise OR Article 62, para. 2). Elsewhere 
the claim for recovery of undue payment in the same circumstances is a matter of judi-
cial decision based on case law (per analogiam with Articles 1376–1381 CN and §1435 
ABGB). The claim is not recognized by Russian law.61
The authors of the interwar period insist that the condiction cannot be granted un-
less the parties explicitly and forcefully specifi ed the purpose of the benefi t in the text 
of the agreement (for example in the form of a condition). A specifi c, personal objective 
(whether a causa impulsiva as in the Polish term “pobudka” (a direct motive, or urge to 
act) or a long-term goal, causa remota) does not count unless it is mentioned in the con-
tract with an emphasis that leaves no doubt about its importance.62
Present-day consensus favours the interpretation that causa in that condiction means 
causa effi  ciens, applicable for example in the case of contracts that were cancelled. 
Cases of prepayment or inducement to act in a certain way are exemplary of  condictio 
causa data causa non secuta: here the benefi t changes hands although the parties are 
59  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 579; R.Longchamps de Bérier, Nienależne świad-
czenie, p. 1077. Similarly Articles 493–495 with reference to the Civil Code of 1964. Where the non-perfor-
mance of the obligation was not due to fault and the situation was not covered by a lex specialis, the claimant 
should look to condictio causa fi nita (P. Mostowik [in:] System prawa prywatnego, p. 305). 
60  F. Zoll Sr, Pandekta, p. 198.
61  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 574; P.Księżak, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 22; 
and W.Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 111.
62  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 578–580. Similarly I. Rosenblüth; he suggests that 
to make the personal objective of the contract fully eff ective it would have to be included among essentiale 
negotii of the contract. Roman law treats purpose as one of the special arrangements of a transaction (ac-
cidentalia negotii); the indispensable essentialia are the name of the goods, their quantity and price. It seems 
that Rosenblüth’s remark put him among those who were in favour of greater explicitness and clarity in the 
articulation of purpose in the text of contracts (cf. I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks 
zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 261). Meanwhile Wiktor Lentz, after analyzing the provisions of the German 
law, takes the opposite view (W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 102): the purpose (goal) of a contract 
should be plain to see, although it does not have to be stated in the text expressis verbis. It is suffi  cient for it to 
be connected with the judicial act as its essential element; at the same time, however, the belief (state of mind) 
of one party that the other party enters into the agreement in order to achieve a particular aim is not enough. 
Cf. also J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań, p. 190.
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not bound by an obligation, i.e. the giver does not act solvendi causa.63 Interwar jurists 
(cf. Note 62:  L. Domański, W. Lentz, J. Namitkiewicz, and I. Rosenblüth) stressed the 
importance of the intended purpose mentioned in the contract, yet their examples hardly 
diff er from those used today (e.g. advance payment or acknowledgement of the receipt of 
loan). The apparent discord is a matter of approach: from their perspective the contract 
is essentially an agreement about the purpose (goal) of the transfer of benefi ts. Here are 
some of the typical situations which, in their opinion, could be handled with the use of 
the condictions:
– in Roman law the mere threat of using condictio causa data causa secuta puts 
pressure on the other party of an innominate contract (with no right of action) to 
make them deliver;64
– the benefi t was transferred together with an off er which was not accepted by the 
off eror;65 
– an advance payment had been made in the expectation of entering into a contract, 
an event that did not materialize;66
– benefi ts were transferred under a conditional contract, but the suspensive condi-
tion was not fulfi lled;67
– a receipt of loan had been given to the lender, but the loan was not paid out; or, 
a document confi rming the performance of an obligation had been handed out, but 
the obligation was not discharged;68
– a dowry had been established and paid out, but the planned marriage was can-
celled. French, Austrian and German laws are very clear about the liability and the 
restitution of all that had been handed over for the sake of a marriage that eventu-
ally did not take place (Article 1088 CN, §1247 ABGB, and §1301 BGB);69
– the benefi t was transferred to the accipiens for his advantage, but he spent it on 
something that had not been envisaged by the parties to the agreement; benefi ts 
were transferred to induce the accipiens to do something, e.g. to appoint an heir, 
which he then failed to do; a donation had been made, accompanied by a sub 
63  P. Mostowik [in:] System prawa prywatnego, p. 307; M. Sobczyk, Zamierzony cel świadczenia nie 
został osiągnięty, p. 1019–1020 and 1026. 
64  A. Kremer, Kontrakty nienazwane w prawie rzymskim w świetle kazuistyki [Innominate Contracts in 
Roman law from the Perspective of Casuistry], Kraków 1993, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Jagiellonian 
Library, Dokt.71/93, p. 38; P. Księżak, Świadczenie niegodziwe, p. 9; M. Sobczyk, Zamierzony cel świadcze-
nia nie został osiągnięty, p. 1016–1017; F. Zoll Sr, Pandekta, p. 199.
65  J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań, s. 190; A. Ohanowicz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 492.
66  J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań; M. Sobczyk, Zamierzony cel świadczenia nie został osiągnięty, 
p. 1019.
67  W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 100. For a diff erent view cf. I. Rosenblüth (in: J. Korzonek, 
I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 260) who believes that this case justifi es the use of con-
dictio causa fi nita.
68  A. Ohanowicz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 492; Uzasadnienie, p. 183; F. Zoll Sr, Pandekta, p. 
199. For a diff erent view cf. I. Rosenblüth (in: J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, 
p. 260) who matches this case with condictio causa fi nita. 
69  Cf. the Supreme Court Judgment of 28 October 1938, C.II 826/38 (the marriage did not takeplace 
due to the death of the bride). L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 596; P. Księżak, Świadczenie 
niegodziwe, p. 9; W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 81 and 92; M. Sobczyk, Zamierzony cel świadcze-
nia nie został osiągnięty, p. 1018; F. Zoll Jr, Zobowiązania w zarysie, p. 115; F. Zoll Sr, Pandekta, p. 199. W. 
Dajczak, T. Giaro, F. Longchamps de Bérier (Prawo rzymskie, p. 523) suggest the use of condictio sine causa. 
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modo obligation, which the donee failed to satisfy; a donation mortis causa had 
been made, but the donor outlived the donee; a conditional heir or legatee fulfi lled 
his obligations, but in spite of that his name was struck off  the will or was pre-
vented from entering upon the inheritance.70 
7. Exclusion of claims for restitution 
The provisions of the KZ, especially Articles 131 and 132,71 set forth the situations 
where claims for restitution of conferred benefi ts could be barred, even if, in the light of 
Articles 128–130, they may appear undue. The exclusion of such claims was buttressed 
further  by Articles 88–89 (on interest) and 128 para. 2 (cf. point 4 a).
Articles 131 and 132 deal for the most part with benefi ts that can be claimed back 
under the provisions of Articles 128 i 130 in principio, i.e. cases where the legal ground 
was missing from the very beginning. Originally they were to be put immediately after 
Article 128, but their ultimate placement is due to the fact that in some cases Article 131, 
point 2 could also apply to a benefi t exposed to claims based on condictio causa fi nita 
(Article 129 in principio) – although the legal ground was invalidated, the moral obliga-
tion remained.72
a) Natural (imperfect) obligations 
Natural obligations form a heterogeneous group whose individual elements have in com-
mon two interlocking determinants: the solvens is denied the right of action for the res-
titution of the benefi ts already conferred, and the accipiens has the right to retain the 
benefi ts (soluti retention). The term is of Roman orgin (obligatio naturalis) and has 
been incorporated into Romance legal systems (CN). German-speaking literature makes 
a distinction between liability and indebtedness, but fi nds claims not based on positive 
law unenforceable. In the German legal system the type of obligation upon they rely is 
regarded as imperfect (“unvollkommene Verbindlichkeit”). It seems that Polish jurists 
70  W. Dajczak, T. Giaro, F. Longchamps de Bérier, Prawo rzymskie, p. 522; M.Sobczyk, Zamierzony cel 
świadczenia nie został osiągnięty, p. 1019; F. Zoll Sr, Pandekta, p. 199.
71  Art.131. The claim for restitution of a benefi t is barred: 1) if the right to bring action for the recovery of 
debt is denied by statute or because of the statute of limitation has expired; 2) if the conferred benefi t complies 
with a moral duty, expectations of decency or custom; 3) if the person transferring the benefi t willingly knew 
he was not obliged to do, unless he reserved for himself the right to claim the benefi t back, the transfer was 
done under duress, or  it was a legal act prohibited by law or whose purpose is turpitudinous.
Art. 132 §1. Whoever pays another person willingly for the carrying out of an act that is illegal or violates 
good manners, or in order to induce him to carry out such an act, has no right to claim the return of what he 
paid.
§ 2. Likewise a person who fulfi lled an obligation by carrying out a legal act with a turpitudinous purpose 
if the turpitude was on his side has no right to bring action for recovery.
72  Uzasadnienie, p. 185.
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have for the most part used the term “zobowiązanie naturalne” which is equal to the 
natural obligation (positive law has taken no notice of it).73
Before the Polish system came into force in the interwar period natural obligations 
were recognized in all mature legal systems that existed in Poland except the Russian 
Imperial law. Their enforcement depended on two legislative techniques. The fi rst one is 
associated with the CN, which declares in Article 1235 that the voluntary fulfi lment of 
a natural obligation does not justify a claim for repayment based on condictio indebiti. 
The identifi cation of specifi c cases of natural obligations is left to case law and legal 
scholarship.  
The other method can found in codes of the German branch of law (ABGB, BGB) 
and in KZ. They do not proclaim a general rule as in Article 1235 CN, instead they list 
the specifi c unactionable (“nicht einklagbare”) natural obligations. So §1432 ABGB dis-
allows claims for the recovery of a payment of debt beyond the statute of limitations, 
a debt which is invalid only because of defective form, a debt which is hard to match 
with a claim. The provisions of the German Civil Code mention the following imperfect 
obligations: debts after the statute of limitations (§222 II BGB), a reward for “informa-
tion about an opportunity” to be used for the conclusion of marriage (§656 BGB), debts 
and obligations that arose from games and betting (§762 and §764 BGB), and “compli-
ance with a moral duty or the rules of social propriety” (§814 BGB).
According to KZ “a benefi t is not recoverable 1) if the right to bring a claim for 
the recovery of debt is denied by statute, or the debt has been found time-barred; 2) if 
the conferred benefi t complies with a moral duty, [expectations of] decency or custom” 
(Article 131, points 1–2). The hypothesis of Point 1 encompasses the following exam-
ples:
– payment of time-barred debt (as in §1432 ABGB; §222 II BGB; Article 63 OR; 
Article 411, point 3 KZ; French case law). An error in the application of the stat-
ute of limitation does not matter, i.e. a payment made on the erroneous assump-
tion that the debt was still owed cannot be claimed back;74
– payment of debt that could not be recovered in court because of the expiry of the 
limitation period (explicitly in §1432 ABGB)75 or because of its nature, i.e. it in-
volved obligations from games and betting  (Article 610 §1; §762 BGB, and also 
Austrian, French, and Swiss legislation);76
73  The Supreme Court held that “there is hardly any diff erence between a natural obligation and one 
which is barred by statute” (Supreme Court Judgment of 6 April 1936 (C.II. 2845/35, Orzecznictwo Sądów 
Polskich, 1936, item 148, p. 129–130). Cf. also L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 581–582; Z. 
Fenichel, Zobowiązania niezupełne (naturalne) w Kodeksie zobowiązań [Imperfect (Natural) Obligations in 
the Code of Obligations], “Nowy Kodeks Zobowiązań” 1936, Nos. 16–17, p. 62.
74  The statute of limitation was taken into account when it was pleaded by the debtor, and the court was 
not in a position to bring it up ex offi  cio (Article 273). Cf. L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 
576, 582, 584; Z. Fenichel, Zobowiązania niezupełne, p. 75; I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, 
Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 263–264. 
75  The courts would not admit the plea of ignorance of the preclusion. Cf. L. Domański, Instytucje 
Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 582.
76  All the commentors point out that a claim for the recovery of a benefi t conferred out of fear – con-
nected with  the misapprension that the law does enforce obligations from games and betting – that the other 
side may go to court to enforce payment. Having said that, it should be possible to bring action for the re-
covery of a benefi t conferred under the misapprehension that the game or bet was lost. In the latter case the 
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– the so-called contracts for diff erence (Diff erenzgeschäfte), or in today’s terminol-
ogy forward contracts (Article 611; §764 BGB)77; debts arising from loans to 
purchase alcohol;78 debts reduced through a bankruptcy or creditor arrangement 
procedure.79
The source of duties mentioned in Article 131, point 2 are “the injuctions of religion, 
morality, honour and decency, that is standards of behavior generally accepted in society 
at large and among friends and acquaintances”. The examples under this rubric were 
similar to those found in §1432 ABGB, §814 BGB, Article 63 OR and in the construc-
tions of the French case law.80 Among the benefi ts representing moral obligations or 
expectations of decency are maintenance and alimony payments in cases not covered 
by the law, e.g. to concubines,81 relatives,82 as well as all every description of depend-
ents (indigents, the chronically ill, the elderly, other people’s children).83 As a rule the 
recovery of benefi ts given away to those categories of persons could not be claimed back 
unless it was done on behalf of a third party without authorization (cf. Articles 115–121). 
At the same time, the recipient of this form of support was not entitled to claim its con-
tinuation if the provider decided to cut it.
recovery is justifi ed not by the outcome of the game or bet, but by the fact that there was no reason for the 
payment to have been made, not even  natural obligation. Cf. Z. Fenichel, Zobowiązania niezupełne, p. 66; 
J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań, p. 191–192; Uzasadnienie, p. 186; L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu 
zobowiązań, p. 583; I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 263. 
77  Z. Fenichel, Zobowiązania niezupełne, p. 67. 
78  Cf. Article 9 of the Act of 21 March 1931 imposing restrictions on selling serving and consuming 
alcoholic beverages (Dz.U.R.P. 1931, No. 51, item 423). Cf. Z. Fenichel, Zobowiązania niezupełne, p. 67; I. 
Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 263.
79  Article 171 and the Decree of the President of the Republic of Poland of 24 October 1934: Bankruptcy 
Law (Dz.U.R.P., No. 93, item 834); and Article 20, para 1, point 3 and the Decree of the President of the 
Republic of Poland of 24 October 1934: Settlement Procedures Law (Dz.U.R.P., No. 93, item 836).
80  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 584; Uzasadnienie, p. 187. 
81  Benefi ts conferred on a concubine do not qualify for recovery. But on what ground? I. Rosenblüth (in: 
J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 264) places them in the category of moral 
obligations (Article 131, point 2). Other commentators agree about the legal consequences (recovery is out 
of the question), but diff er widely about the legal qualifi cation. So L. Domański would have such claims 
dismissed on the basis that the purpose of the transaction was incompatible with good manners (Article 132, 
para.1). The Supreme Court’s refusal to grant a condiction in this case was justifi ed by the solvens’ taint of 
turpitude (Supreme Court Judgment of 21 September 1934, C.I. 481/34, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich, 1935, 
item 135; cf. also in 7c below). It seems, however, especially in the light of the Supreme Court’s judgment 
that the treatment of the claim for recovery may be decided on a case by case basis; i.e. it may depend on 
whether the benefi t was conferred to induce the accipiens to become a concubine (a case of turpitude, as in 
the ruling mentioned above) , or whether it was transferred because the recipient was a concubine (a case of 
compliance with an extralegal duty). 
82  So, for example, the Supreme Court held that a “father in law who provided free maintenance for his 
son in law may not bring a claim in unjust enrichment for the recovery of his expenses, if he provided the 
maintenance in a free and voluntary manner in the spirit of moral duty, as a father in law towards his son in 
law, and not in order to obtain an appropriate recompense”. More precisely, “the claimant… provided the 
defendant… in the course of a year with breakfasts, dinners, teas and suppers to the tune of 75 złotys per 
month”. Cf. Supreme Court Judgment of 18 August 1937, C.I. 2368/36, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich, 1927, 
item 705, p. 658–659.
83  Z. Fenichel, Zobowiązania niezupełne, p. 63, 66.
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Other situations aff ected by the bar of Point 2 include donations to charity, churches 
and religious institutions; presents off ered to others on various occasions; Christmas or 
fi nancial year end bonuses and gifts given to employees.
The benefi ts described in Article 131, point 2 – for example the maintenance and 
alimony payments – could be higher then the statutory ones, but that did not open the 
door to prospective claims. The law is equally fi rm in barring claims for recovery of 
benefi ts transferred on the mistaken assumption that it is legally enforceable obligation. 
An exception to that rule is the situation where claimant acted under the erroneous belief 
that the child who received the benefi t was his own.84 In accordance with Article 355, 
para 3 regulations concerning donations, including formal requirements ad solemnitatem 
and claims for the recovery of donated property do not apply to the provisions of Article 
131, point 2.85
The treatment of natural obligations vitiated by a defective ad solemnitatem formula 
diff ers from country to country. In Austria §1432 ABGB in no uncertain terms bars the 
recovery of a benefi t conferred in fulfi lment of an invalid contract on account of defec-
tive form ad solemnitatem, by declaring such a transaction an act of natural obligation.86 
Similarly in  French law: a donation inter vivos signed in private, which was not enforce-
able until the donor’s death, becomes a natural obligation, and if the will is found invalid 
it is because the required form was not complied with. Moreover, obligations incurred 
by a minor and not confi rmed by his legal guardian are treated as natural obligations. 
A condition cannot be used to challenge the fulfi lment of this type of obligation.87
On the ground on German, and also Polish law, the abovementioned obligations are 
not regarded as natural, but void ab initio. In eff ect, the conferred benefi ts can be re-
covered. De Bérier’s Uzasadnienie fi nds the BGB system more convenient because it 
checks the expansion of the realm of natural obligations and thus prevents them from 
interfering with the enforcement of specifi c statutory regulations of legal procedure and 
legal capacity. With regard to the legal status of minors the authors of the KZ take the 
view that a minor cannot assume a legally binding obligation, but can pay a debt  owed 
by somebody else, “if a minor had money to spend, he did well paying off  a debt rather 
than wasting it”.88
b) Knowledge of an obligation not owed
A claim for the recovery of a benefi t cannot be granted to a person who transferred it 
while he knew he was not obliged to do it (Article 131, point 3 in principio; §1432 in 
fi ne ABGB; §814 BGB; Article 63 OR, and Article 411, point 1 KC). The lawmakers’ 
reasoning behind this provision is that if the solvens knew he was under no obligation to 
84  W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 100; I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks 
zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 264.
85  A. Fischler, Condictiones według polskiego Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 143; Z. Fenichel, Zobowiązania 
niezupełne, p. 77.
86  Z. Fenichel, Nieważność umowy, p. 8–9 (in practice §1432 ABGB was applied in disputes concerning 
donations, wills, and marital property; and Uzasadnienie, p. 187.
87  R. Longchamps de Bérier, Nienależne świadczenie, p. 1077.
88  Uzasadnienie, p. 184, 186.
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the person to whom he transferred benefi ts, he was acting gratuitously, and the benefi ts 
are gifts to donee. Their advice to the claimant was “to put up with the consequences and 
stop pestering the courts with his vexatious claims for recovery”.89 As a result, the claim 
of undue payment could be brought only by a solvens who transferred the benefi t by 
mistake, under the misapprehension that there was an obligation that he had to fulfi ll.90 
Crucial to the rejection of the claim is the solvens’ positive awareness that there is no 
obligation (on him); the law is not interested in whether it was possible for him to get 
informed on this point or whether there were doubts about it. Nor does it matter whether 
the misapprehension represents a mistake of fact law or mistake of law. This is clearly 
stated in §1431 ABGB; other legal systems judicial decisions and academic doctrine 
gradually came to the same conclusion (in France, Germany, Poland91, and – after some 
misgivings – in Switzerland). Roman law, and later also German law, insist that the sol-
vens’ mistake be exculpable. This requirement has been waived in Austrian, Swiss and 
Polish law.92
The burden of proving that the solvens was aware of the absence of an obligation – 
i.e. did not act under misapprehension, which would deprive him of the right to bring 
a claim for recovery – usually lies with the accipiens (so in Austrian, German, Polish,93 
and Russian law). 
The solvens is required to prove that a/ he completed the transfer of the benefi t, b/ it 
was undue; which allowed the law to presume that c/ the act was performed under mis-
take. The role of the accipiens is to refute that claim by proving that the solvens was not 
under mistake and well aware of the lack of obligation, i.e. was acting animo donandi. 
The solvens’ knowing error is treated as a negative (exclusionary) condition of the ad-
missibility of the action in recovery.
89  R. Longchamps de Bérier, Zobowiązania, p. 226.
90  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 587; and I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Ro-
senblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 259. “The error must accompany the transfer of the benfi t and 
indicate that there exists an obligation which is being fulfi lled”, cf. Supreme Court Judgment of 5 July 1935, 
C.II. 600/35, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich, 1936, item 301, p. 280–281. In another ruling the Supreme Court 
held against a tenant who claimed a reimbursement of overpaid rent, as he had not been acting under mistake 
at the time of payment. Cf. Supreme Court Judgment of 16 February 1937, C.II 2507/36, Orzecznictwo Sądów 
Polskich, 1937, item 727, p. 679–680.
91  Cf. Supreme Court Judgments of 28 October 1938, C.I. 1642/37 (in: J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks 
zobowiązań, p. 193) and of 18 July 1952, C.809/15 (in: S. Breyer et al., Prawo cywilne z orzecznictwem, 
literaturą i przepisami związkowymi: praca zbiorowa [Civil Law with Judicial Decisions, Literature, and 
Trade Law], vol. 1, Warszawa 1958, p. 221). 
92  P. Księżak, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 20, 22 and 210; J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań, p. 
193; I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 265; and F. Zoll Sr, 
Pandekta, p. 196. Following §814 BGB German law rules out the use of condiction as soon as it is found  that 
the solvens was not sure about the existence of doubt. In its judicial practice the Polish Supreme Court took 
a diff erent line and held, following the ABGB, that the nature of the solvens’ error is immaterial (i.e. whether 
it is exculpable), even to the extent of clear negligence. To justify its approach the court drew on the Roman 
maxim Lege non distinguente nec nostrum est distinguere [Where the law does not distinguish, neither should 
we distinguish.] Cf. Supreme Court Judgment of 29 August 1934, C.II. 811/34, Nowy Kodeks Zobowiązań, 
1934, item 478, p. 503-504.
93  Cf. Supreme Court Judgment of 30 November 1936, C.III 51/35 (in: J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks 
zobowiązań, p. 189). Cf. also L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 576; R. Longchamps de 
Bérier, Nienależne świadczenie, p. 1077. 
1-łamanie z specjalny.indd   84 2017-12-15   15:03:55
85
Artykuły – Articles
French law which, following into the footsteps of Roman law, treats the mistake as 
appositive condition of admissibility of a condiction. That, of course, results in shift-
ing the burden of proof in the lawsuit. In marked contrast to other legal codes, the CN 
sets forth the following conditions of admissibility of a condictio indebiti: a) the pay-
ment was discharged; b) it was undue, c) the performance was carried out under mistake 
(Articles 1376–1377 CN). Now it is the solvens who has to demonstrate that he acted 
under a misapprehension. Switching the burden of proof gives rise to extraordinary dif-
fi culties in the presentation of evidence for it requires the solvens to make out a case 
that he was unaware of the absence of an obligation. Faced with such an accumulation 
of negativities the courts tried to be liberal in their assessment of the occurrence of the 
mistake; sometimes it was enough to demonstrate that the solvent had doubts about the 
existence of the obligation.94
The Polish Code of Obligations in Article 131, point 3 granted the solves – in excep-
tional circumstances – the right to bring a claim for recovery even if he was aware that 
the obligation did not exist. The conditions are formulated as follows:
– he transferred the benefi ts not of his accord. Here the admissibility of the claim 
for recovery resulted a contrario from the initial part of the provisions of Article 
131. For example, in the course of an execution against the property of an alleged 
debtor, a certain sum of money was seized (the offi  cial enforcement is treated 
as a solvens’ own act) and the judgment of an appellate court, or an enforceable 
judgment of a court of the fi rst instance, was enforced , but then due to some ex-
traordindary legal procedures, the debtor obtained a favourable judgment;95
– if at the time of the transfer he reserved for himself the right to claim the ben-
efi t back, which, however, could be justifi ed if the solvens was sure that he did 
transfer the beneft but was not yet able to prove it, or when the solvens did not 
know if the debt was enforceable; if a requisite condition was satisfi ed; or if his 
representative had already transferred the benefi t. Or, anxious to avoid the nega-
tive consequences of falling onto arrears, he discharged the obligation, at the same 
time reserving the right to claim back the transferred benefi ts should new circum-
stances justifying a repudiation of the obligation come to light. Ludwik Domański 
points out that the admission of exclusion clauses in obligations concerning the 
transfer of benefi ts shows due respect for the freedom of contract.96
– if the transfer took place under duress – both psychological (threats, Article 41) 
and legal coercion. For example, when the solvens paid another person’s debt to 
avoid the auctioning of his own assets in somebody else’s possession; if the sol-
vens paid another person’s debt to avoid the seizure under execution mistakenly 
directed against his own property;97
94  Similarly under Swiss law (Article 63 I OR). Cf. W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 78; J. 
Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań, p. 192; Uzasadnienie, p. 187.
95  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 576, R. Longchamps de Bérier, Nienależne świad-
czenie, p. 1078; and I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 257.
96  L. Domański (Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 588) points out that a condiction could be brought 
if the event mentioned in the exclusion (but only that event) did occur. Cf. also R. Longchamps de Bérier, 
Nienależne świadczenie, p. 1078; Uzasadnienie, p. 187.
97  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 589; R. Longchamps de Bérier, Nienależne świad-
czenie, p. 1078.
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– if the transfer of benefi ts was part of a transaction prohibited by law or whose 
purpose is morally odious. No doubt the legislators included this exception to the 
rule of non-recovery under this heading to block attempts at circumventing the 
law by voluntary performance of agreements that are illegal or immoral.98 The use 
of a condiction (here condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam) is still possible if 
there is no proof of moral turpitude on the part of the solvens (i.e. a situation not 
covered by Article 132).
c) Moral turpitude – in pari delicto
Article 132 bars the claim for recovery of a solvens whose conduct was tainted with 
moral turpitude. Whereas the hypothesis of paragraph 1 of Article 132 refers to a solvens 
who willingly paid his part of the deal in return for the performance of an act that was 
illegal, violated good manners, or was intended to induce the accipiens to commit such 
an act, the hypothesis of paragraph 2 refers to a solvent who fulfi lled an obligation with 
a turpitudinous purpose (causa impulsiva, causa remota), and in the litigation has to bear 
the taint of turpitude.99 As the latter hypothesis encompasses also the cases covered in 
paragraph 1, it need not have been included in the KZ. It was done so because, we are 
told, it covers “the exceptionally drastic cases”.100 This is plainly unconvincing as the 
provisions of either paragraph have the same legal consequences and the cases described 
in paragraph 1 are covered by paragraph 2. 
Roman law is clear about not allowing a party implicated in wrongdoing to take 
advange of the law to press its claim, i.e. nemo auditur turpitudinem suam allegans. 
This maxim forbids the admission of a claim for recovery from a solvens whose case 
is founded on an illegal or immoral act. When both parties are equally culpable for 
a wrong (in pari causa), the courts would not get involved and uphold the status quo, 
in accordance with the maxim in pari turpitidine melior esse debet causa possidentis.101 
Alternately, the law could react to that situation by ordering the seizure of the contested 
benefi t. The latter solution has the backing of Article 168 of the Lwów Committee Draft: 
“Whether the object of the transfer is seized, depends on the provisions of public law, 
which the presiding judge should never lose sight of” (in fi ne).102 The regulations of
98  J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań, p. 192; Uzasadnienie, p. 187–188.
99  It could be the case of a solvens transferring a benefi t under a sham contract of sale whose true pur-
pose is to protect a property from seizure or to cover up a donation agreement. Cf. for example the Supreme 
Court judgments of 11 May 1946, C.II. 574/45 (in: S. Breyer, Prawo cywilne z orzecznictwem, p. 222; W. 
Święcicki, Orzecznictwo powojenne, p. 90–92) and of 21 September 1934, C.I 481/34 (in: J. Namitkiewicz, 
Kodeks zobowiązań, p. 194) respectively.
100  Uzasadnienie, p.189.
101  W. Dajczak, T. Giaro, and F. Longchamps de Bérier, Prawo rzymskie, p. 522; P. Księżak, Świadczenie 
niegodziwe, p. 15–16.
102  L. Domański, Instytucje…, p. 591. In accordance with Article 412 KC the court can order the seizure 
of the object transferred knowingly so that in return the other party of the agreement would perform an act 
prohibited by law or an act with a turpitudinous purpose. In the earlier version of this rule, which was in force 
until 1990, the seizure was enacted ex lege, and the relevant judgment was merely declaratory. 
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Article 132 were hardly a novelty. Similar rules could be found in ABGB (§1174), BGB 
(§817), the French body of law, OR (Article 66) and COFI (Article 27, para. 2).103
The corresponding Austrian norm – based on the generally accepted interpretation of 
§1174 ABGB – rules out an action for the restitution of a benefi t that was delivered to 
achieve something that was either impossible or prohibited. Nevertheless, a claim for re-
covery could be allowed when, even though the basic agreement was unlawful, there was 
nothing illicit about the counter-performance that was to complete the deal. In practice it 
means that under Austrian law it is possible to bring claims for the recovery of usurious 
interest, an advance payment for brokering a marriage, money lost by playing at cards, 
etc. §1174 in fi ne also grants the right to claim for the recovery of a benefi t transferred in 
order to prevent a wrongdoing.104 
The German BGB allows a claim for restitution “if the purpose of performance was 
determined in such a way that the recipient, in accepting it, was violating a statutory pro-
hibition or public policy” (§817 in principio BGB). In Poland, the assessment of whether 
the accipiens’ action was tainted with moral turpitude had to involve court rulings about 
the purpose of the performance. The eff ect of letting the Supreme Court infl uence the in-
terpretation of the provisions of that subsection of the Code can be seen in the following 
judgment: “… §814 KC [the exclusion of a condiction when the benefi t was transferred 
in the belief that no obligation was owed, J.H.] cannot be applied to usurious interest as 
it is strictly forbidden to extort it or to receive it…”. The justifi cation, it is worth not-
ing, focuses not on the solvens knowingly making a payment that is not due, but on the 
accipiens obtaining benefi ts that are prohibited by law. In other words, if the purpose of 
the performance (in this case usury) violates a statutory prohibition, the benefi t has to be 
given back by the recipient (cf. §817 KC).105 However, the taint of turpitude precludes 
the solvent’s claim unless – given some exceptional circumstances – the performance 
consisted in entering into an obligation, e.g. the issuing and handing over of a promis-
sory note rather than paying in cash (§817 in fi ne BGB)106.
The Polish legislator, as the wording Article 131 point 3 in fi ne makes clear, does not 
rule out the claim for recovery by a solvens whose performance does not come within 
the purview of Article 132, i.e. a solvens aware that he owed no obligation resulting from 
an unlawful or immoral act, but was not at fault on account of turpitude. In that case the 
claim for recovery could be based on Article 130 (shadowing the Roman condictio ob 
turpem vel iniustam causam), i.e. if the obligation was intended by one of the parties to 
103  P. Księżak, Świadczenie niegodziwe, p. 25–64; Uzasadnienie, p. 188. 
104  W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 92–93.
105  Cf. Supreme Court Judgment of 27 November 1936, C.III. 774/36, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich, 
1937, item 158, p. 138–139. Interestingly, the judges used the abbreviation “k.c.” (Civil Code) for the BGB 
which provided the basis for settling that dispute. It may be noted as well that on the date of the judgment the 
provisions it refers to were no longer in force. They had been repealed on 1 July 1934, as the new Code of 
Obligations came into force.
106  Uzasadnienie, p. 188–189. This provision was needed to handle cases where the German legal sys-
tems recognizes abstratct juristic acts. So, in the case of a contract with a turpitudinous purpose – under which 
the claimant transferred property rights and issued promissory notes for the benefi t of the defendant who was 
to become his lover – the Supreme Court, acting on the basis of the CN, held that it was no longer possible 
to recover the real property and, secondly, that the latter transaction intended to produce an obligation which 
was tainted could have any legal consequences (Supreme Court Judgment of 21 September 1934, C.I. 481/34, 
Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich, 1935, item 135, p. 114).
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achieve a morally odious outcome then – in accordance with Article 56 – it was invalid, 
which in turn opened the way for a claim for the recovery of the transferred benefi t fol-
lowing Article 130, but only for the solvens not tainted with turpitude (as stipulated by 
Article 132, para. 2). For example, this condition could be used by a solvens who off ered 
a benefi t to an accipiens in order to induce him to obey the law or dissuade him from 
committing acts prohibited by law. 
If Article 132 was left out, the obligations listed there (e.g. an agreement to perform 
an act prohibited by law) and regarded invalid ex lege (Article 56), could nevertheless be 
enforced with the help of a condiction. This would have been possible because – follow-
ing Article 130 – the invalidity of the agreement opened the way for bringing a claim for 
the recovery of a transferred benefi t. This argument shows that Article 132 which blocks 
that path to a solvens in pari causa is in fact indispensable. It can be argued further that 
just as under Roman law it was possible with the help of condictio causa data causa non 
secuta to compel the other side to perform unactionable innominate contracts so it should 
be possible for a promisee to use the condition to make the promisor to deliver – now 
suppose the promisor were a hitman and the job was to kill.
However, Article 132 could not be invoked to fend off  a claim for compensation. Yet, 
in a situation when both the giver and the recipient are equally at fault (in pari delicto), 
but the guilt or disgrace (turpitudo) of one party was caused by the unscrupulous conduct 
of the other party, the former (the victim) is granted the claim for damages against the 
latter.107
d) Interest
Provisions setting certain limits to claims for the recovery of interest can be found in 
Articles 88 and 89. So Article 88 denies relief to a debtor who willingly paid undue 
interest and wants to recover the sum of money in question or to have it set off  against 
the principal.
107  This is illustrated by the Supreme Court Judgment of 26 November 1926, C. 168/26, Orzecznictwo 
Sądów Polskich, 1937, item 334. The claim concerned the recovery of real estate sold under an invalid 
contract. The property was priced in German marks which constituted a violation of the Currency Act of 20 
November 1919 (Dz.U.R.P., 1919, No. 91, item 492) and made the contract invalid. The court held that the 
claim should be granted because even though the seller knew of the currency law the buyer had planned to 
acquire the property in a fraudulent manner. Similarly in the Supreme Court Judgment of 29 January 1927, 
C. 44/26, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich, 1927, item 400, p. 458–459; but diff erently in the judgment of 12 
May 1923, C. 159/22 (the latter in: Z. Lisowski (ed.), Kodeks cywilny obowiązujący na ziemiach zachodnich 
Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej [The Civil Code in Force in Western Poland], Poznań 1933, p. 324). Cf. also a Su-
preme Court ruling which bars the claim for “the recovery of payment provided for in Article 132, para. 1, in 
the case of defrauding under the pretence of casting magic spells (a criminal off ense which falls within the 
scope of article 264 of the Criminal Code). The co-operation of the plaintiff  in such acts, though contrary to 
good manners and prohibited by law if from penal sanction (Article 23 §3 of the Criminal Code), stemmed 
from her superstitious belief and lack of education and were only a means to carry out hre fraudulent designs 
and obtain the sum of 600 złotys” (Supreme Court Judgment of 17 August 1937, C.II. 431/37, Nowy Kodeks 
Zobowiązań, 1938, No. 17, p. 67). For a more detailed account, cf. P. Księżak, Świadczenie niegodziwe, p. 
96–105. 
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Similar rules appear in the Austrian and German legal systems (§813 II BGB). 
However, as Wiktor Lentz points out, drawing on German law, discounted interest rates 
presuppose the existence of debt. Consequently, in a situation where payment had been 
made before the obligation came into being, because the suspensive condition was still 
pending, it should be possible to bring a claim for the recovery of interest payments.108
8. Limits of the accipiens’ liability
The Polish Code of Obligations fi rmly upholds the principle of restitution of undue pay-
ment in Article 133,109 cross-referenced to Article 123 on unjust enrichment.110 Generally, 
the rules governing restitution in cases of undue payment and unjust enrichment are the 
same; in the German and the Swiss system it is the consequence of the two instruments 
being treated jointly. Austrian law, however, distinguishes between two types of liability, 
one connected with misappropriation (“use for the benefi t of another”), the other with 
undue payment (§§1041 i 1432 ABGB).111 Unlike the Austrian provision for misappro-
priation, the KZ limits the liability of the enriched person to the extent the benefi t of use 
still remains.112 In this respect the Polish Code follows the German and the Swiss model. 
Elsewhere (Austria, France) the liability of the recipient is not limited to the net value of 
the enrichment.113
In their application of the unjust enrichment law the courts as a rule relieved the ac-
cipiens from the obligation to repay that part of the enrichment which he had spent on 
his day-to-day living expenses, but upheld his liability for benefi ts (property) that had 
been diminished by use or had deteriorated. The accipiens, it was pointed out, should 
have known the risks and responsibilities of taking possession without a legally binding 
title.114 
108  W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 92, 100; Uzasadnienie, p. 183.
109  Art. 133 §1. A person who obtained an undue payment is obliged to restore it in accordance with 
provisions concerning unjust enrichment.
§2. If the recipient of benefi t knew it was not owed he is also liable for damages. 
110  Cf. Supreme Courtt Judgment of 13 May 1953, C.387/53 (in: S. Breyer, Prawo cywilne z orzecznic-
twem p. 223). L. Domański maintains that “Para. 1 of Article 133 of te Code of Obligations treats obtaining 
undue payment as unjust enrichment” (L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 597). However, 
this statement is at least imprecise: the Code of Obligations enjoins the use of provisions concerning unjust 
enrichment in cases of recovery of undue payment. This does not mean that the two concepts lose their dis-
tinctness.
111  This was the result of the disappearance of one phrase from §1041 in media parte ABGB – “even 
though later the benefi t came to nothing” –  from the provisions concerning condictio indebiti.
112  For a diff erent view cf. A. Ohanowicz, Niesłuszne wzbogacenie, p. 178. Pointing to the separation of 
unjust enrichment and undue payment in the KZ, he argues that it is possible to bring a claim for the recovery 
of undue payment even in situations where the accipiens was not enriched. However, this view was isolated.
113  S. Meier, Restitution in Case of Undue Transfer, p. 1472. A diff erent view with regard to Austrian 
law, cf. W. Lentz (Note 117).
114  Cf. Supreme Court Judgments of 1 April 1954, 2.C.47/54, and 1 April 1953, 1.C.131/53 (in: S. 
Breyer, Prawo cywilne z orzecznictwem, p. 223).
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That said, it should be noted that the KZ, like the systems of law, expands the ambit 
of the accipiens’ liability if he accepts a benefi t in bad faith (Article 133, para. 2). By do-
ing this the legislators affi  rm the general rule that an accipiens who knowingly acquires 
benefi ts he is not owed cannot expect relief from the courts. Austrian and Swiss courts 
applied stricter liability whenever they saw there had been good reasons for the accipiens 
to be in doubt (following §1437 ABGB and Article 64 OR).115 Meanwhile, for Polish 
and German courts bad faith meant positive knowledge of the wrongdoing, and not just 
negligent ignorance. The burden of proving it, in accordance with Article 133, para. 2, 
lay with the solvens. Art. 133 para. 2 was always applied in cases condictio ob turpem 
vel iniustam causam: the accipiens, who was at fault on account of turpitude could not 
plead ignorance of the law, and his bad faith was presumed.116
Roman law treats an accipiens guilty of bad faith with great severity, no better than 
a thief. Austrian and French law (§§335 and 1437 ABGB117; Articles 1378–1379 CN 
respectively) treat an accipiens guilty of bad faith on a par with a possessor in bad faith 
and therefore liable for “the capital as well as the fruits”, diminution, deterioration or 
loss by accident of the property or assets in question. An analysis of Article 127 in con-
nection with Article 133 indicates that KZ too makes the accipiens in bad faith liable for 
any loss, even if caused by a fortuitous event. The German code limits the liability, or the 
scope of restitution, to those losses, including uncollected fruits or interest on a loan, that 
happened through the accipiens’ fault or negligence.118 So, taking into account both the 
presumptions and the scope of stricter liability of the accipiens in bad faith, the authors 
of the Polish Code of Obligation took the middle road of moderation, more lenient than 
the Austrian model and stricter than the German one.
The provisions concerning the restitution of unjust enrichment could also be applied 
in cases of undue payment that did not result in unjust enrichment (like the case of the 
mail order company mentioned above). Roman Longchamps de Bérier was alone in dis-
cerning that special case. His solution was to require the recipient to make restitution in 
kind and to pay the expenses: if the object in question was aff ected by use, the contract 
and the concomitant obligation to pay did come into being (the acceptance of the off er 
can be inferred from the off eree’s conduct). If, however, if the object was lost while be-
ing delivered, no contract was created and the risk of loss must be borne by the off eror 
(cf. Article 69).119
115  P. Księżak, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 14; and W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 107.
116  L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 598.
117  W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 93: The provision of § 1437 ABGB describing the eff ects 
of the accipiens’ good and bad faith refers literally to condictio indebiti only, but it is by general consent 
extended, by general consent, to the remaining condictions.
118  W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 107; Uzasadnienie, p. 189–190.
119  R. Longchamps de Bérier, Zobowiązania, p. 229. 
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9. Conclusion
There is a widespread consensus among legal scholars that the authors of the Polish 
Code of Obligations of 1933 looked for inspiration to the Swiss Obligationenrecht.120 
This analysis of the functioning of the concept of undue payment in the KZ and in some 
contemporary European legal systems confi rms Paweł Księżak’s thesis of the KZ’s in-
debtedness to the German BGB and the Swiss OR in that fi eld.121 Yet the KZ does not 
copy the solutions of these two codes of law. The most important diff erence is the separa-
tion of unjust enrichment and undue payment; and there are more diff erences on the level 
of specifi c regulations. In contrast to German law, the KZ does require that the solvens’ 
error justifying the use a condiction has to be an exculpable. In contrast to the OR, the 
solvens is not required  to prove that he was unaware of the nonexistence of the obliga-
tion at the time he transferred the benefi t. There are even more dissimilaries between the 
KZ and Napoleonic Code, the KZ and the Austrian ABGB; they are due chiefl y to the 
structure of the older codes. In particular, each of them handles the obligation to restore 
the object of undue payment in a markedly diff erent way – here the Polish approach 
draws on the BGB and the OR.
Finally, any comparison of the current Polish Civil Code with its predecessor would 
show how remarkably similar they are. For the most part the present-day regulations 
follow those of the KZ. Probably the most signifi cant departure from the old code is the 
replacement of the exclusion of condiction (Article 132 KZ) by the action of forfeiture of 
the object of transfer tainted with moral turpitude (Article 412 KC). The fact that Code 
of Obligations of 1933 has undergone no substantial revision in the course of subsequent 
reforms of civil law is the best proof of its outstanding merit. 
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